that generated another cartography of the Pacifi c, as refl ected in a map of the tracks of the sailing ships on Cook's three voyages. (See fi gure 2).
I juxtapose these two maps to ponder the relationship between indigenous and foreign representations of Oceania and to situate such representations in the changing histories of relations between Pacifi c peoples and strangers, between Islanders and those who are called (tongue-in-cheek, in an important volume [Borofsky 2000]), "Outlanders." Indigenous and foreign representations of the place and its peoples are now not so much separate visions as they are "double visions," in the sense of both stereoscopy and blurred edges. Foreign knowledges of the Pacifi c have both used and aspired to eclipse indigenous knowledges, as is obvious from the earliest forms of ethnology in the region. 5 Indigenous visions have, since the late eighteenth century, been challenged and partially transformed through encounters with the imagined cartographies of travelers, missionaries, traders, planters, and other agents of colonialism, capitalism, and development. As Tongan scholar Epeli Hau'ofa has suggested (1994) , outsiders' representations of the Pacifi c matter not just because of their geopolitical and discursive hegemony but because Islanders have, in part, come to see themselves through the Outlanders' lenses.
But how far and how do constructs of place and people that emanate from "beyond the horizon" displace local visions? Tupaia's map is a good example. Though he is the author, this map is not his indigenous view. We will never know the details of that view, but his vision was likely a rather differently "situated knowledge." 6 I suspect it located the observer not soaring high above the islands, powerfully riding on the confi dent coordinates of longitude and latitude, plotting a changing global position relative to east and west, north and south, but rather lying low in a canoe, looking up at the heavens, scanning the horizon for signs of land, and navigating the powerful seas with the embodied visual, aural, olfactory, and kinesthetic knowledge passed down through generations of Pacifi c navigators. His knowledge would have been communicated to other Tahitians through genealogical stories and chants, through the materials of the canoe and the sails, and through the embodied practice of navigation (see Finney 1992; Finney and others 1994;  and the fi lm Sacred Vessels [Diaz 1997]) .
7 Such full-bodied knowledge is here etiolated and converted through the agency of a quill and a piece of parchment into a map. Moreover, the Tahitian names and dispositions of islands are not just written down and graphed as a map, but situated in and saturated by the discursive frame of "discovery" of Enlightenment voyaging.
8 Figure 1 . "Tupaia's Map," reproduced from Forster 1996, 303-304 ; this version of the map was fi rst published almost 230 years ago (Forster 1778) . Australia 2006, 107) . © National Museum of Australia 2006. world of light was separated from the world of darkness. So, for instance, Mäori relate the canonical whakapapa (genealogy), telling of how the separation of the sky father, Ranginui, from the earth mother, Papatuanuku, distinguished the world of light from the world of darkness. Mäori also tell of the arrival of a "great fl eet" of several waka or canoes from the homeland of Hawaiki, and how with the dispersal of these several canoes of settlers across the north and south islands of Aotearoa / New Zealand, different iwi (people, bones) were attached to different places. Other genealogical histories (for example, those told in many parts of Fiji, and in Grande Terre in New Caledonia) posit a difference between the fi rst "people of the place," the commoners or low-ranking people, from those who arrived later, the chiefl y or high-ranking (see Bensa and Rivièrre 1982; Douglas 1994; Abramson 2005; Jolly and Mosko 1994; Jolly 1994b; Sahlins 1985) . Still other genealogies, like those I recorded in Vanuatu in the early 1970s, tell of a journey not from across the sea in a canoe but from the skyworld, and suggest that the fi rst human beings were all men ( Jolly 1994a, 141-143 ; see also Taylor forthcoming) .
In all these places, in many variants, such stories of creation, of fi rst and later arrivals and of movements of ancestors across the land -in settlement and cultivating gardens -are the basis of contemporary claims to land. In such genealogies the relation between people and place is posited not as "ownership" or human possession but as mutual possession. The land is seen as active not inert, as possessed of people, living and dead. This imbrication of body and land is palpable in language and in corporeal practice. In many Austronesian languages, the word for land (whenua, fanua, vanua) is the same as that for placenta, and a person's attachment to place is secured by the planting of the placenta soon after birth. Of course the potential for embodying this connection to land today differs dramatically across the Pacifi c between those independent states (like Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Vanuatu, and Fiji) where customary land and sea custodianship prevails and those colonies (like Hawai'i, New Caledonia, and Aotearoa / New Zealand) where the claims of the fi rst people of the place are in tension and sometimes violent confl ict with those of later settlers or migrants.
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Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia
Indigenous genealogical plots of connection and difference across the Pacifi c were challenged early on by another genealogy of European origin: ethnological typology (compare Linnekin and Poyer 1990) . From the late eighteenth century, European observers discerned important differences among the "nations" of the South Seas, differences of race and differences of place. In the writings of J S C Dumont d'Urville in 1832 and G L Domeny de Rienzi in 1836-1837, such differences were categorized as Polynésie, Mélanésie, and Micronésie.
12 In a map of Océanie published in 1854 (attributed to Emile Levasseur, but based on Dumont d'Urville's writings), the boundaries between them are accentuated, with hand coloring (fi gure 3).
13 These ethnological labels have been persistent. The meanings of the words have shifted, but the way in which ethnic differences are connected with geographic location and with political and moral cartographies is more constant. This is obvious from the fi rst foreign attempts to plot differences among the "isles of the South Seas." Europeans developed racial and cultural typologies that-although they never marked borders patrolled by the protocols of immigration, like nation-states-formed imagined boundaries in their typifi cation of "like peoples." Such typologies were patently predicated on a presumption of the superiority of European races and cultures; the Europeans plotted the peoples of the Pacifi c at various removes from themselves and, thus, from each other. This is clear, even in the more inchoate and uncertain constructions of the late eighteenth century, such as those developed by the Forsters, which were more open to modifi cation in the light of events and contingent and changing experiences (see Jolly 1992; Douglas 2006) .
Let us look more closely at J R Forster's Observations (1778 , a text that differs from most of the others from Cook's voyages, which are rather based on daily diaries and logs, contemporaneous and recollected narrative accounts, plotted by the spatiotemporal coordinates of a journey. Forster's is a different genre -the de-temporalized, de-spatialized, seemingly disembodied writing of the philosopher and the ethnologist. It combines the authority of "being there" (central to the literature of the grand tour in Europe and travel beyond) with the claim to scientifi c objectivity and detached contemplation assumed by the late eighteenth century philosophers (see Jolly 1997; Thomas 1996, xxv) . It is a "natural history"; Forster's comments on the varieties of peoples lie beside other refl ections on the "natural varieties" of the Pacifi c: of fl ora and of fauna, the formation of the land and the ocean, volcanoes, icebergs, and waterspouts.
In this huge and extraordinary tome, Forster established a gradation of the Pacifi c peoples visited on Cook's second voyage. He contrasted two "great varieties" or races: "the one more fair, well limbed, athletic, of a fi ne size, and a kind benevolent temper; the other, blacker, the hair just beginning to become woolly and crisp, the body more slender and low, and their temper, if possible more brisk, though somewhat mistrustful" (Forster 1778, 228; Forster 1996, 153) . This contrast was complicated by a series of internal gradations. In the fi rst group, in descending order, he ranked Tahiti and the Society Islands, the Marquesas, the Friendly Isles (Tonga), Easter Island (Rapa Nui), and New Zealand (Aotearoa). In the second, again in descending order, are New Caledonia, Tanna, and Malakula, the last two being islands in an archipelago Cook named the New Hebrides, now Vanuatu.
14 I should stress that Forster's typology was developed before Cook visited Hawai'i on the third voyage and excludes not only those islands but also many others of the northern and western Pacifi c, later classifi ed as Micronesia (which I do not consider here, but see Hanlon 1998 Hanlon , 2006 . Although Forster's racial typifi cations anticipated the nineteenth-century labels of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia, they were not just precursors to the harder racialist science and evolutionism of that later epoch. Physical characteristics-the colors and contours of bodies, the shapes of faces, and the textures of hair-were important to Forster, but these were seen not so much as immutable essences but rather as more changeable, subject to climate and latitude, to modes of living, labor, and producing food, and to the people's degree of vigor or indolence (see Jolly 1992 , Douglas 2006 . At certain points he portrayed the Mäori, and those of the South Island especially, as "slipping down" from others in that fi rst race, because they were dislocated from the benign warmth of the tropics to the austerity and cold of the southern islands (Forster 1996, 192) . But their degeneration was also seen as the result of their social deprivation: remote from their ancestral origin, unable to use past wisdom, and, especially in the sparsely inhabited South Island, deprived of the benefi ts of creativity and education that Forster derived from the density of human company (Forster 1996, 198 ; but see also Thomas 1997b).
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Thus, Forster's racial plots entailed both a progressive movement toward civilization, and another movement, one of degeneration rather than devolution. But they were still racial plots, ranking peoples in temporal stages, and associating the social stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization with infancy, adolescence, and adulthood. So, even if European Enlightenment scholars debated the nature of nature, the fate of civilization, and its propensity for corruption, they were usually confi dent in their own superi- ority as "adults" overseeing the growth or degeneracy of other races. And so I read Forster's creating of racial hierarchies not as the disembodied science that it purports to be, but as an exercise in embodied license, in tasteful curiosity. He charted aesthetic gradations from the ugly and gloomy Malakulans to the beautiful and felicitous Tahitians.
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As I have argued elsewhere ( Jolly 1992 ( Jolly , 1993 ( Jolly , 1996 ( Jolly , 1997 , representations of women were critical to Forster's racial typologies, which linked contemporary "others" in the Pacifi c with postulations about Europe's own past, "the ancients," and prospective future. "Woman" was the sign and prophetic index of the passage from savagery to civilization, just as she was the sign and portent of the dangers of opulence, corruption, and overheated commerce in Europe itself. Pacifi c women were both index of hope and portent of danger, in the uncertain path toward "progress" that these explorers charted. Bernard Smith has suggested that the representation of women's beautiful and accessible bodies, as much as the rapturous rendering of landscape, evoked an image of Tahiti as Arcadia; yet, simultaneously, women's alleged lasciviousness and their sexual commerce with foreign men evoked the dark side of that island (1985, (44) (45) (46) (47) . But the ambiguous potency of the fi gure of woman is even greater if we consider not just Tahitian women but also the women from other parts of the Pacifi c with whom they were regularly compared and contrasted.
Not all Pacifi c women were represented in the same way. In very general terms, the differences form along a border between east and west. 17 The women of the eastern islands-and especially Tahiti and Hawai'i -were represented as beautiful, sexually alluring, "lascivious ladies," who did refi ned work and were revered and elevated -perhaps too elevated for the sensibilities of European men. The women of the western islands -especially Tanna and Malakula (in the New Hebrides, now Vanuatu), and to a lesser degree, New Caledonia-were depicted as ugly, sexually unappealing, and sexually sequestered "beasts of burden," cruelly oppressed by men. This contrast in beauty, erotic appeal, and power is seen most starkly in the representations of sexual liaisons with European men, which were frequent in Hawai'i, Tahiti, and Tonga, rarer in Aotearoa / New Zealand, and absent in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides (Vanuatu). This difference is typically explained by recourse to the subjectivity of the women involved: At the eastern extreme, Pacifi c women are portrayed as lasciviously leaping into the sea and onto the ships, fully licensed with agency and sexual desire, whereas at the western extremities they are depicted as either being forcibly kept back from the beaches or being coerced into prostitution in exchange for hatchets, nails, cloth, or beads. The contrasting fi gures are those of subjects and objects, agents and victims. The position of women is seen, as it often was and is, as an index of civilization, but indigenous women's agency is even portrayed as catalytic to the process of the "passage" to civilization (for illustrations and further argument, see Jolly 1993; compare Guest 1996;  see Tcherkézoff 2004a and 2004b for more recent, dedicated deconstructions of the myth of Polynesian women's sexual hospitality; see also O' Brien 2006) .
Later ethnological typifi cations by explorers, missionaries, and ethnographers deployed other criteria to distinguish Polynesians and Melanesians (see Thomas 1997a) -the development of material culture, the openness or closure to foreign infl uences, and in particular the degree of political hierarchy. Twentieth-century anthropologists may have eschewed the racial basis of that classifi cation, but ethnic plots were still insinuated in talk of cultural evolution or development. Thus an early and infl uential paper by Marshall Sahlins plotted a contrast between the "chiefs" of Polynesia and the "big men" of Melanesia (1963), a contrast that much later research has queried, on empirical and theoretical grounds (Douglas 1979; Jolly 1987; Jolly and Mosko 1994) . Sahlins's formulations, though more ironic than Forster's, are similarly imagined through the lens of European history, although, as I have remarked in an earlier publication (1987), in Sahlins's imagining of the Polynesians as "feudal" and the Melanesians as "capitalist," there is a devolutionary subplot to the cultural evolutionary plot that suffused his work during this period.
Despite much recent critical commentary and deconstructive effort (eg, Thomas 1989; 1997a; Clark 2003) , maps with such tripartite divisions between Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia regularly appear in the texts of anthropology, history, and linguistics, as well as in the visual displays of museums, in ways that tend to essentialize and naturalize ethnic difference. For instance, here is a version of a map of "culture areas of the Pacifi c," currently provided by the Center for Pacifi c Island Studies at the University of Hawai'i (see fi gure 4).
Moreover, the terms are deployed in the self-designations and claimed identities of Pacifi c peoples -"the Melanesian way," "the Polynesian triangle," "the Micronesian world."
18 As grounds for identity they are no doubt less salient for most Islanders than place of origin, language, and nation. But in the language of the educated, of political and cultural elites at regional meetings, and in the articulated identities of migrants, they are more important. As Albert Wendt noticed (1999, 400), such typifi cations The denigrations of such ethnic hierarchies have been subverted, for example, in the writings of Bernard Narokobi (1980), Papua New Guinean lawyer and politician, in the period soon after PNG independence. His depiction of "the Melanesian way" as a "total cosmic vision of life" was both philosophical celebration and nationalist tract. He vaunted the smallness, the connecting communalism, and the spirituality of the indigenous in opposition to the large scale, the anonymous individualism, and the materialism of an imagined West (see Otto 1997) . But, although Narokobi constructed Melanesian values as the antithesis of Western, he did not critically engage the detail of earlier foreign typifi cations, but rather gave a new, positive, alternative meaning to "Melanesian." 19 Other Islanders have been more sardonically subversive of the language of ethnic types. For the opening of the Tjibaou Cultural Center in New Caledonia in 1998, Mäori sculptor Brett Graham exhibited his beautiful troika, Three Standing Stones or Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia. Melanesia is the red one (made of stone from India). These three stones were inspired by a sense of regional connection in the common heritage of Lapita pottery. The stones were broken and reassembled like shards found by archaeologists. Said Graham, "I split the stones and put them back together again as a metaphor for the destruction and reconstruction of these cultures" (quoted in Kasarherou and Mozziconacci 1998, 90 ; see image reproduced in Jolly 2001b, fi gure 9, 438).
"Framing The Islands"-Regions And Rims
I now turn from a discussion of the way in which differences have been plotted within the Pacifi c to the way in which differences have been imagined between the "inside" and the "outside" of the Pacifi c, between the "region" and the "rim." I use Greg Fry's telling phrase to suggest how in any image of Oceania there is always a "frame," an "edge" (1996) , and to highlight how, as with photography, the point of view is crucial. Any map of the Pacifi c or Oceania charts what is inside and what is outside. This is nowhere clearer than in that contested notion of the "Pacifi c Rim," those countries-maximally North and South America, Asia, and Australasia-that edge the Pacifi c. These are seen through such discourses to be both its geographical limits and its commanding heights-the high ground of strategic economic and geopolitical interest and of moral presumption. I will talk in a moment about one such high ground-Australia. But let me start with a brief allusion to the debates about Pacifi c Rim discourse as it developed in the United States.
Arif Dirlik was the fi rst to point out the distinctly American origins of the idea of the "Asia-Pacifi c" (1992), and he has clearly been central in developing a critique of the associated notion of the "Pacifi c Rim" (Dirlik 1993; Wilson and Dirlik 1995) . But I here draw rather on a paper in the latter volume by Chris Connery (fi rst published in 1994), which argues that the idea of the Pacifi c Rim emerged in the mid-1970s and was dominant in the US geo-imaginary until the 1980s. In Connery's view, it is a discourse not just appropriate to but "determined" by its epoch-a particular stage of "late capitalism" and the "late cold war" years when the socialist bloc remained the strategic "other." Pacifi c Rim discourse is, he contended, not an "othering" discourse (like orientalism or cold war geo-imaginaries) but one predicated on equivalence through proximity, alliance, even similarity.
Moreover, for Connery, the idea of the Pacifi c Rim presumes neither a center nor a fulcrum of power, although he later in the same article argued that its psychic center is the United States-Japan relation, and that China was crucial in "the mythic construction of the Pacifi c Rim as telos" (Connery 1994, 32) , presumably in providing the scene for the rapprochement of the United States and Japan. He stressed that this was a period when United States hegemony was doubted in a way unique in the postwar era; its defeat in Vietnam, the ascendancy and threat of Japan as a global power, and the economic decline of the 1970s all contributed to such doubt.
Connery explored the complicated ways in which space and time are imagined in the languages of late capitalism, with modernization theory deploying the language of temporal teleology (such as "latecomers"), which, he argued, displaced or obliterated spatial languages (of "remote" or "backward" regions) (1994, 34) . As I see it, the spatial and temporal languages are co-present and complicit. Following Arturo Escobar (1995) , we might note the earlier spread and rapid "naturalization" of the spa-tiotemporal regions of "developed" and "underdeveloped," "First" and "Third World," "North" and "South." Connery further suggested that the new realities of the Carter and Reagan years erased that temporal teleology: Japan and the East Asian "newly industrialized countries" (nics) were no longer "the West's past" but perhaps even in its future, the telos of transformative capitalism. In this strategic circumstance, US scholars and politicians are seen to develop a discourse of equality and connectedness for this new "coprosperity sphere," especially with the fi rst tier of nations on the rim ( Japan and East Asian nics), but even with the second tier (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, coastal China).
20 Their connection and similarity is imagined through the naturalized vision of "free trade," an open world market, which fi nds its preferred locale not in landlocked Europe but in the Pacifi c Ocean.
The idea of a Pacifi c Rim had a further advantage: it centered on an ocean. Water is capital's element. . . . The bourgeois idealization of sea-power and ocean-borne commerce has been central to the mythology of capital, which has struggled to free itself from the earth just as the bourgeoisie struggled to free itself from tilling the soil. Movable capital is liquid capital, and without movement, capital is a mere Oriental hoard. (Connery 1994, 40) This imparts new meanings to the processes of navigation and the dialectics of settlement and movement! I could further elaborate Connery's extraordinary analysis of this ideology of the Pacifi c Rim, 21 but, rather, at this point I want to suggest how this vision (and perhaps even his analysis of it) occludes the "inside" of the Pacifi c. The ocean has become not an American lake but a lack, a hole, like the proverbial hole in the donut (compare Hau'ofa 1994) . And those who live in the Pacifi c, the Islanders, are not imagined as part of that sphere.
I now turn from this peculiarly American vision of the "Pacifi c Rim" to the peculiarly Australian vision of the "Pacifi c region." This is not to suggest that Pacifi c Rim discourse has not been heard in Australia. It has, especially in the pronouncements of economists and political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s, but it was and is subordinated to the discourse of the "Pacifi c region." This seems geopolitically rather than geographically determined. Australia is no global power, but as a regional power it presumes a special privileged relation to the Pacifi c and acts not just as ally but often as proxy to US imperial interests.
In my discussion of Australian visions of the Pacifi c region, I am heavily indebted to the work of Greg Fry (1996) , who analyzed how, from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the islands were "framed" by Australian government and academic discourses, not like Asia as the future promise of capitalism, but as its terminus-its doomsday. 22 Fry discerned a "doomsday scenario" in Australian academic and policy discourses about the Pacifi c in the decade prior to his writing. In this nightmare vision, the region is seen in danger of "falling off the map." Its proponents warn about failures of development as measured by gross domestic product; "soaring populations"; unsustainable exploitation of resources; the marginalization of Island economies with globalization; and the withdrawal of powerful aid donors with the end of the cold war. If the nightmare cannot be averted, then overpopulation, poverty, unemployment, ecological devastation, and declining health will surely ensue. To avoid the doomsday path, Island states need to open their economies; effect structural change and good governance; abolish customary land tenure and inappropriate, undemocratic traditions; and connect with the dynamism of Asia. Such diagnoses and remedies saturated not just the speeches of Labor government ministers like Gordon Bilney, but the views of many bureaucrats, academic economists, and demographers as well as some journalists (most notably Rowan Callick, writing in the National Centre for Development Studies publication, Pacifi c 2010, in 1993). In such writings, Australia is cast both as model and savior of the Pacifi c, its future and its prophet.
But, as Fry argued so persuasively, much of this is hyperbolic rhetoric, reliant on dubious statistics and partial knowledge. Important dimensions of Pacifi c experience are omitted-such as the continuing centrality of subsistence economy. This is not easily included in the commodity accounting of gross domestic product, and moreover is grounded in customary land tenure, which is seen in this view as an obstacle to "development." The assessment of a poor or stagnant economic performance is based on uncertain data. The specter of overpopulation is overdrawn-with the experience of one or two countries, most notably Papua New Guinea and the Solomons, being extrapolated to the region as a whole. I have criticized this particular specter in far more detail elsewhere ( Jolly 2001a) , suggesting not just that it is overgeneralized (compare Underhill- Sem 1994) , but that it is historically vapid, ignoring the prior ghost of Pacifi c depopulation and ascribing the causes of overpopulation to the allegedly natural regimes of indigenous fecundity rather than locating its more likely origins in the transformation of the reproductive lives of Islanders consequent on their conversion to Christianity and the effects of colonizing capitalism.
Although the ecological degradation of mining, logging, and fi shing in the Pacifi c region might induce greater cause for alarm, in the diagnoses of these doomsday prophets, the blame is most often attached to venal local interests and rapacious Asian companies (Malaysian logging fi rms, Japanese and Korean tuna boats), while Australia's own extensive interests in mining in several countries are passed over in relative silence. This doomsday scenario was much criticized, not just by Fry and other academics, but by several Island prime ministers at the time, including Sitiveni Rabuka of Fiji, Paias Wingti of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Mamaloni of Solomon Islands, and Geoffrey Henry of the Cooks, as well as the then president of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (Fry 1996, 4) . But, arguably, the scenario has not gone away, and Australian talk of Pacifi c "crisis" has been strengthened in recent times by the heightened fear of fragile or "failed" states, violent coups, and secessionist movements-the war in Bougainville, the Sandline crisis in Papua New Guinea, the several coups in Fiji, the confl ict between Guadalcanal people and Malaitans in the Solomons, and the prospect of continuing bloody events in West Papua, as well as the specter of continuing refugee streams from there and elsewhere.
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In Australia, the southwest Pacifi c has been frequently described in the talk of defense analysts, politicians, and journalists as "an arc of instability" (see May 2003) . Such talk has pervaded the public imagination of the Pacifi c in Australia since the turn of the twenty-fi rst century. The events that unfolded after George Speight and his followers invaded Fiji's Parliament on 19 May 2000 were headline news for weeks in Australia. Some Australian politicians were forthright in their condemnation of the coup leaders as "terrorists" and in their calls for the restoration of democratic government in Fiji and the equality of all citizens, regardless of race. Threats of bans and boycotts from Australia were consequential in the unfolding of events, especially after the release of the hostages. Australian politicians' language and actions in this period were criticized before the United Nations by the interim prime minister of Fiji as a new form of imperialism. And although the unfolding events of the Fiji coup of 2006 led by Commodore Bainimarama have not attracted such consistent attention in the Australian media, he was able to capitalize on the proximity of Australian warships, ostensibly sent to evacuate Australian citizens, to warn the Australian government against intervention. In the event, Prime Minister John Howard eschewed such intervention, suggesting that Australian forces would not be seen fi ghting on the streets of Suva, intervening in what was an internecine struggle among Fijians. Such logic did not deter Australia from intervention in Solomon Islands or East Timor, albeit at the request of prevailing or prospective governments in those countries (see Charlesworth 2006) .
Although sensitive to such accusations of neocolonialism, Australia has in the last decade become far more interventionist in the southwest Pacifi c, not just in relation to its erstwhile colony, Papua New Guinea, with whom it still proclaims "a special relationship" (see Denoon 2005) , but also in several other countries of the region, most notably Solomon Islands through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, or ramsi (see Kabutaulaka 2005; Fraenkel 2004; Moore 2004) . Although some have seen this as mirroring the preemptive strategy of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, justifi ed as defl ecting future threats and establishing democracy and human rights, Australia's presumption to represent and infl uence events in the lives of near Pacifi c Islands primarily derives from its role as "neighbor," military ally, economic investor, trade partner, and aid donor. It is not alone in this, of course: Americans, Canadians, the French, New Zealanders, the Japanese, and increasingly the Chinese are engaged in similar ways. But the Pacifi c seems more focal in the imperialist imaginaries and development dreams of Australia. And in this region, as in Asia, Australia locates itself ambiguously as both inside and outside the region. In the Australian colloquialism, it is "our backyard." "Our Sea Of Islands"-Epeli Hau'ofa's Alternative Vision I now consider very briefl y the writings of Epeli Hau'ofa, whose alternative vision of Oceania has proved especially infl uential (1994, 1998, 2000) . His new vision was created in defi ance of the languages of colonial partitions, the borders created by the ethnological typifi cations of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia, and in resistance to the discourses of developmentalism that typically imagine the Pacifi c as a proliferation of small states characterized by isolation, defi ciency, danger, and doom (as in Australian doomsday scenarios discussed earlier). Since I have already discussed Hau'ofa's alternative vision in detail in the pages of this journal ( Jolly 2001b ), I will be brief. But I do need to reiterate how he writes against the orthodoxies of foreign experts and especially those economists emanating from the World Bank and the Australian National University who constantly typify the Pacifi c in terms of what it lacks: not only the palpable absence of development or growth, but the defi ciencies of scale, isolation, and dependency-small islands, with tiny populations, remote from world centers but increasingly dependent on them. What Hau'ofa has rather stressed is the connecting sea-how, despite the diversities of languages and cultures, there is an ocean of connection among Islanders.
Moreover, Hau'ofa has argued that besides the privileged relationship between Islanders and Outlanders, between indigenous and the foreign representations of the Pacifi c, we must ponder the relations between Islanders living "inside" and "outside" the Pacifi c. Those "outside" include large numbers of Hawaiians who are living elsewhere in the United States (see Kauanui 2005) ; the large diasporic communities of Tongans, Samoans, Cook Islanders, and Niueans in Aotearoa / New Zealand, Australia, and North America; some smaller communities of Micronesians overseas; and, increasingly, Indo-Fijians who, in the wake of the Fiji coups, have increasingly emigrated to New Zealand, Australia, and North America (Pangerl nd) . They also include descendants of South Sea Islanders who migrated to labor on nineteenth-century plantations, who are living in Australia, New Caledonia, and Sämoa. In such migrations from the nineteenth to the twenty-fi rst century, the peoples of Oceania have again become world travelers. And in the process of resettling they have had to establish relations not just with dominant white settlers but also with the indigenous peoples of these several nation-states. In some places, like Hawai'i and Aotearoa / New Zealand, this has tended to situate Pacifi c peoples as "natives" or "migrants," as indigenous or diasporic, as "rooted" or "routed" (see Clifford 1997) , rather than as sharing a deep genealogy of cultural and historical connection-the great Ocean of Hau'ofa's vision.
Hau'ofa aspires to embrace all these places in his expanded world of Oceania ( Jolly 2001b, 425) . This expanded world not only blurs the boundaries of nation-states but also emphasizes the connections between Islanders beyond and within nation-states. In such a vision the relation between Islanders is seen as more independent of their relation to white settlers or Europeans (see Jolly nd b). So, Teresia Teaiwa and Sean Mallon have suggested an "ambivalent kinship" between Mäori and Pacifi c Islanders in Aotearoa / New Zealand, not so divided as "natives" and "migrants" and in differential relation to Päkehä and the nation-state, but connected, not just by ancient pasts but also by contemporary cultural affi nities and kinships (2006) .
In his innovative project of establishing the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture on the campus of the University of the South Pacifi c (fi gure 5), Hau'ofa has emphasized not so much the differences among Islander student populations and others resident in Suva-indigenous and Indo-Fiji- ans, Solomon Islanders, Tongans, Samoans, I-Kiribati, Banabans, and so on-but rather their affi nities and relations. Through the visual and performing arts, he is fostering a sense of connection, exchange, and mixing more profound than that typically performed in national or regional plots of "unity in diversity" (see Jolly 2005) . This stress on creative exchange among Islanders is especially clear in the brilliant choreography of Allan Alo and his dancers, in the Oceanic music of groups like Sound Waves, based in Suva, and the explosion of creativity in the visual arts under the present direction of that hugely talented artist and writer, John Pule (see Hereniko 2006) .
Conclusion
This paper has offered a summary survey, or as Australians would say, a "Cook's tour." I hope I have suggested both continuities and ruptures in the relation between indigenous and foreign representations of the Pacifi c. They emerge as separate, alternative, even opposed visions, which we might telegraphically encode as genealogy versus cartography. But increasingly, with the emergent power of capitalism in both the epochs of colonialism and development, we witness a "double vision" of stereoscopy and blurred edges in "imagining Oceania." I have suggested, too, that all imaginings of the Pacifi c and its rim are simultaneously visions of space and time. This condensation of time and space is apparent in both indigenous genealogies and foreign cartographies or ethnic typologies, in geopolitical imaginaries of Pacifi c Rim and Pacifi c region, in the doomsday prophecies of recent Australian ideologues and the future hopes of Islander scholars, artists, and ordinary people. Finally, I should stress that it is not just the double visions of "East" and "West" from the rim that matter, but the double visions of Islanders, regardless of whether they live inside or outside the Pacifi c, or in between (K Teaiwa 2002), in Hau'ofa's enlarged world of Oceania. 
Notes
1 I cannot here address the huge literature that critically considers cartography as a modernist European knowledge saturated with power. This has been a major preoccupation especially in the writing of critical geographers. For one synthesis of some of this work, see Gregory 1994. 2 I remember vividly (as a young anthropologist working in the archipelago of Vanuatu in the early 1970s) being quizzed by a young man of Bunlap (a kastom village) who had neither been to school nor exposed to Western-style maps of the world, about the disposition of the countries of Europe. Frustrated by my attempts to plot in words or explain with an atlas the geographic situation of England, France, Germany, and Spain, he asked, "But tell me, Margaret, which one is the last island?" He thus transposed a vision of the archipelago he lived in onto the countries of continental Europe.
3 My reference to Japan here relates to the context of this paper's fi rst presentation (see acknowledgments).
4 Tupaia's name was usually spelled Tupaya in the Cook voyage materials. Anne Salmond has offered the best appraisal of Tupaia and his world to date, consummately evoking the complicated indigenous politics of rank, rivalry, and religion in which he was enmeshed and his central role as navigator and interpreter on Cook's fi rst voyage (2003, 34ff ) . As a priest of 'Oro, the war god, he was intimately involved in a violent politics of conversion, carrying his worship from island to island. See also Dening 2004, 170ff . The arioi were those men and women who dedicated themselves to 'Oro. They comprised mainly unmarried aristocratic men from the highest ari'i class, but also some ari'i women and some men and women of the median rank, ra'atira, and numbered about a fi fth of the total population. They traveled around the islands like strolling players, feasting at others' expense, and performing chants and dances, theatrical farces, and satires about the chiefs. They were also reputedly sexual libertines but were proscribed from reproducing. Any offspring born to an arioi, male or female, had to be killed (Gell 1993, 147) . For some arioi, membership was a lifelong vocation, but others left while still young to marry and to reproduce.
5 Ethnology predates the practice of professional anthropology, as is clear from the ethnological writings of early explorers, missionaries, and colonial officials. At the point that anthropology was establishing its disciplinary credentials in the early twentieth century, some, like Bronislaw Malinowski, were keen to dis-tance themselves from earlier "amateur" observers, claiming both an objectivity and an expert knowledge based on fi eldwork and participant observation, which allegedly made anthropologists different. Though educated as an anthropologist myself, I consider this a self-serving, shallow genealogy.
6 I here echo the phrase so associated with Donna Haraway's writing (1991), which contends that all knowledge is situated and partial, and criticizes those who so readily associate vision with hegemonic power (as in certain facile treatments of Foucauldian notions of the panopticon-that space of the asylum where all the movements of inmates could be seen and controlled -or those who ascribe too much power to the colonial or masculinist gaze; compare Jolly 1997. Haraway insists on the embodied nature of all vision, so that we can "reclaim the sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere" (1991, 188) . Even seemingly disembodied visual technologies such as ultrasounds, computer screens, and televisions exist in complex relations to human bodies. Some authors have claimed that the new technologies like Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and the virtual realities of cyberspace are different from those visual technologies that posit the world as spectacle, since the former, through their energetic rotations and kinesthetic turbulence, radically destabilize the body of the viewer and deconstruct their power.
7 I do not want to imply by this that there was not also full-bodied knowledge in the European experience of navigation. The visual technologies of cartography were complemented by similar experiential processes, and indeed Cook and his sailors learned from Tupaia and other Islanders to discern signs of land in the appearance of land birds and changes in the patterns of seaweed and fi sh. See Dening 1998 Dening , 2004 8 See my fuller discussion of this ( Jolly nd b) . Tupaia fi rst sketched the more familiar islands of Ra'iatea, Tahaa, Bora Bora, and Maurua. Although centered on Ra'iatea, his map traverses several thousand kilometers of the Central Pacifi c, from the Marquesas in the east to the Fiji group in the west. He named one hundred thirty islands, including those as far away as New Zealand (Pounamu and Teatea), Tonga, Sämoa, Rotuma, the Tuamotus, the Marquesas, the Southern Cooks, and the Australs.
Nicholas Thomas has suggested that although "Tupaia's map has fi gured as a key source for subsequent inquiries into the geographic knowledge of Polynesians, its extraordinary character as a graphic document that fuses an indigenous perception of the world with the moralizing cartography of the Enlightenment has been strangely unremarked upon" (1997c, 4). Although this is true, we must still ponder the difference between the situated knowledges of eighteenth-century Polynesians and Europeans, and how far the "moralizing cartography of the Enlightenment" actually infl uenced indigenous views of places and peoples (see Jolly nd b). Moreover, some authors have talked about the relation between Tupaia's map and Cook's not so much as a creative translation between Oceanic wayfi nding and European navigation but as an encounter framed by "cartographic méconnaisance" (see, eg, Turnbull 1998, 117ff; Dening 2004) . Neither Cook nor Banks recorded Tupaia's descriptions of islands, sailing directions, or the stories of settlement. Their fractured conversations were probably insuffi cient to allow Cooks and Banks to learn much about the complex arts of Polynesian wayfi nding. We now know that Tupaia learned how to draw other things as well as this map. Tupaia has been revealed as the person who produced several drawings and watercolors, of arioi musicians with their drums, of indigenous Australian men in canoes in Botany Bay, and a sketch of an exchange of a large crayfi sh for white tapa between a Mäori man and Banks -a delightful, iconic image that Salmond used on the book cover of Two Worlds (1997) .
9 I do not mean to imply a strict separation of either peoples or languages here, since there has been much mutual infl uence. For some examples of mutual infl uences among peoples and languages, see Spriggs 1997 and Tryon nd. 10 This list in this order is not meant to suggest a clear staging of settlement. The history of these migrations and settlements is far too contested and complex to recapitulate here (but see Bellwood 1978 and Spriggs 1997) .
11 In the independent states, land disputes are typically decided at public meetings where disputants recount rival genealogies and the more compelling orations usually win out. Land disputes have been the cause of much past and present violence in the Pacifi c. Note the very strong pressure from many foreign agencies of neoliberal persuasion for a transformation from customary to commoditized land tenure, although as Gregory E Rawlings has pointed out for Vanuatu (1999 Vanuatu ( , 2002 , long-term leasehold can be tantamount to alienation, as in the subdivisions on Efate near Pango village, and indeed across much of Efate in the last three years.
12 I should note that the term "Polynesia" was fi rst used by Charles de Brosse in 1756 to refer to all the islands of the Pacifi c. The history of the distinction between Polynesia and Melanesia and the meaning of "race" in European thought has been exhaustively researched and debated of late (see Clark 2003; Tcherkézoff 2003; Douglas 2005 Douglas , 2006 .
13 Océanie also included Australia (as part of Mélanesie) and the Malay Archipelago (as Malaysie).
14 In admitting gradations both within and between these two classes, Forster implied a continuum but also thought that the fi rst could be seen as one tribe with a general character. It is important to stress again that his construction did not rely on essentialist or immutable notions of race (see Douglas 2006) , and, as Thomas has rightly stressed (1996) , there were intersecting temporalities in Forster's plots of the Pacifi c. On the one hand there was a narrative of progress, and on the other, one of derivation from an ancestral origin and climatically determined adaptation.
15 The Mäori were also vaunted for their improved condition in relation to the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego.
16 These racial gradations refl ect degrees of difference not just from Forster's own body but also from European ideals of beauty during this period. Although we might see the male body of the ancients as normative or ideal in eighteenthcentury Europe, the ideal that Forster formulates for the Pacifi c often rather prefers the feminine to the masculine form.
17 I appreciate that this is a rather loose cartographic referent, since Aotearoa / New Zealand is rather far south, and the South Island is as far west as Vanuatu and New Caledonia. But often such spatial language is used contemporaneously to plot the differences. Moreover, I like the way the phrasing plays with the more usual contrast of West and East as Occident and Orient.
18 I have a vivid memory of one of my indigenous Hawaiian graduate scholars at the University of Hawai'i in 1998 complaining, after a reading of Alfred Gell (1993) , that he felt uncomfortable sitting on top of the "Polynesian pyramid"! 19 Thomas adjudged that this cannot readily be seen as a "derivative discourse" based on European models, since the infl uences seem to be more from the philosophers of Negritude in Africa (1997a). Moreover, he argued, it not so much overtly resists Western typologies (since it is hardly in conversation with their detail) as it deplores the more general denigration of Melanesian as primitive or traditional.
20 Of course this hierarchy has again been vastly transformed, after the experience of crisis in Asian economies of the late 1990s, the economic downturn in Japan, and the exponential growth in China and India.
21 Also compelling is Connery's rhetoric about the term "rim": "Consider the word rim, a rim unites-it unites across oceans, across ethnic and racial divides. It presumes a unity, a centeredness with no center, a totality, an unbrokenness. A rim is thin. It is stable but precarious. One can fall off a rim. A rim is a horizon, the horizon of capital, of history, of space and time" (Connery 1994, 41) . 22 Fry's analysis is situated in the longue durée of Australian images of the Pacifi c-from the nineteenth and early twentieth century views of the "South Seas" or "the islands." Even before the federation of the several colonies as a nation in 1901, many Australians saw this region as one where they had a right or even a duty to be engaged, and which they could presume to represent, in both the sense of "speaking for" and of "portraying to the wider world." This presumption was always strongest in relation to the closer countries of the southwest-Vanuatu, the Solomons, Fiji, and especially Papua New Guinea, that erstwhile colony with which Australia has a continuing "special relationship." The presumption was determined not just by geographical proximity but also by complicated colonial histories and the particular circuits of Australian travelers, traders, planters, missionaries, colonial offi cials, soldiers, and development agents (Thompson 1990) . To combat French infl uence, some Australians were eager to push Britain for the annexation of the New Hebrides / Nouvelles Hébrides in the late nineteenth century, but with the failure of that initiative they never presumed close engagement with the remaining French colonies, such as nearby New Caledonia.
23 As I updated this article, a bill designed by the Howard government to further strengthen Australia's border security by processing "offshore" all asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat had just been defeated by a revolt of backbenchers on the government side. This draconian legislation was seen by many as appeasement to the Indonesian government after a group of West Papuans had been granted admission to Australia in May 2006. The "offshore" destinations intended by Howard were cash-strapped islands like Nauru, site of a detention camp for many refugees from 2001, after Australia's earlier tightening of border controls and ominously referred to as the "Pacifi c solution." and peoples. Second, I explore the origins and the lasting signifi cance of the partitioning of the Pacifi c into the spatiotemporal regions of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia, and consider some indigenous uses of these foreign constructs. Third, I refl ect on how academic and policy representations of the Pacifi c "region" and "rim" have been shaped by geopolitical concerns and developmentalism starting in the 1970s, from the viewpoint of Australia (and in a more fl eeting way, the United States). Fourth, through a brief exegesis of the infl uential writings of Epeli Hau'ofa, I consider his alternative vision of Oceania as a "sea of islands." Finally, I confront the specter of new ethnological typifi cations derived from a reading of "roots" and "routes" as dichotomy rather than dialectic, and stress the need for refocusing on the relations and creative exchanges between Islanders living in and between region and rim.
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